Introduction
While there has been significant research into memory forensics (Dodge et al., 2010; Dolan-Gavitt, 2008; Okolica and Peterson, 2010; Schuster, 2006; Walters and Petroni, 2007) , to date there has not been research into extracting Windows clipboard evidence from a memory capture. Memory analysis is a key element of digital forensics. A computer's memory provides the most up to date snapshot of the machine's state: programs are loaded into memory before executing; configuration information is either loaded from disk into memory or entered directly into memory from the keyboard; and active network connections are stored in memory (Okolica and Peterson, 2010) . Leveraging memory to determine the state of the machine at the time of the incident is often critical to success.
In addition to processes, configuration, and network activity, clipboard contents are also critical to forensic analysis (Prosise et al., 2003) . Clipboard contents often provides valuable forensic data, including user passwords, copied sections of classified documents, and incriminating urls. However, while there have been a number of tools written to capture process, configuration and/or network activity (Betz, 2005; Okolica and Peterson, 2010; Schuster, 2006; Walters and Petroni, 2007) , there have not been any tools written to extract Windows clipboard data from memory dumps. The existing command line incident response tool that does display clipboard information is pclip.exe (Carvey, 2007) , which is accessible from sourceforge.net (http://sourceforge. net/projects/unxutils).
The clipboard has been a part of the Windows O/S family since Windows 3.1. Windows uses the clipboard to transfer information between user applications. As a result, it bridges the gap between O/S user functions (handled by user32.dll ) and O/S kernel functions (handled by win32k.sys). This dichotomy differentiates the clipboard from the process, configuration, and network activity, which are O/S kernel functions. As a result, finding and extracting clipboard data requires slightly different techniques.
The remainder of the paper presents an overview of the memory analysis work already done as well as previous research into the Windows clipboard. It then goes on to describe a methodology for extracting the Windows clipboard from multiple Windows operating systems. Finally, it concludes by successfully applying the methodology to several memory dumps from multiple Windows operating systems.
Background

Memory forensics
Historically, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) recommended digital forensic process was to pull the plug and image and analyze the file systems (NIJ, 2009) . While this process is valuable, it overlooks the architecture of computers. Before the computer executes a program, displays a file, or logs an activity, it first loads the information into memory. Memory forensics examines a memory capture from the seized computer. Forensic memory analysis starts with collecting the memory from the target machine followed by parsing the memory dump into meaningful artifacts. Several tools include Schuster's Ptfinder (Schuster, 2006; Schuster, March 2, 2006) and Betz's Memparser (Betz, 2005) . More recently, Volatility (Walters and Petroni, 2007) has emerged as an effective tool for parsing Windows XP memory dumps. Unfortunately, what the above tools have in common is a limitation to a particular operating system (and in many cases, service pack). CMAT (Okolica and Peterson, 2010) increased flexibility by parsing much of the same information out of a memory dump from any of the Windows NT family of operating systems (including Windows XP, Vista, and 7).
All of the existing tools are limited to operating system structures. While Volatility and CMAT provide network information, which does not reside in the kernel, the network driver, tcpip.sys, is still a system level driver. In contrast, the clipboard is a user-level data structure found in user32.dll. While there has been previous work on user-level structures (Stevens and Casey, 2010) , it has focused on finding and carving unique signatures for command line history in memory dumps without tracking it back to the originating processes. This is different from the above tools that start with the processes and use information in them to find other forensic artifacts (network connections, open files, registry keys accessed, etc.).
Windows clipboard
The Windows clipboard is the mechanism that Microsoft Windows operating systems use to allow data to be shared between applications. It first appeared in Windows 3.1, although its functionality has greatly increased since then. Table 1 shows the standard formats used by the clipboard (Petzold, 1999) . However, Microsoft also provides the ability for "private data formats", formats that are application specific (for example, fonts in a word processing program), and that could be registered so that other applications could transfer data in these formats (Petzold, 1999) . Two private data formats that are used extensively are object link embedding (OLE) (0xC013) and dataobjects (0xC009).
For an application to send data to the clipboard, it first allocates a block of global memory using GlobalAlloc, Global-Lock, and GlobalUnlock (Fig. 1 ). It then opens the clipboard using OpenClipboard, empties it using EmptyClipboard, places the clipboard data using SetClipboard and then closes the clipboard using CloseClipboard (Microsoft.com,) . While only one piece of data can be present in the clipboard at any given time, it is possible to send and store that piece of data in multiple formats by performing multiple SetClipboardData functions. This allows applications that handle data in different ways to all have access to it (e.g., text in Microsoft Word with or without formatting). Once data is in the clipboard, the block of global memory belongs to the clipboard and other pointers to it become invalid. Getting data from the clipboard (Fig. 2) is even easier and involves opening the clipboard, determining which of the available clipboard formats to retrieve (this is an application specific task), retrieving a handle to the data, and then closing the clipboard.
Windows data objects
For copying more complex data than text to the clipboard, Windows makes available several APIs which make extraction much more difficult. The original method for exchanging data between applications was dynamic data exchange (DDE 
Methodology
Identifying the method required for extracting clipboard information from a Windows memory dump consists of four steps (Fig. 3 ). First, one or more of the functions in user32.dll or win32k.sys that accesses the clipboard data is found. The functions described in (Petzold, 1999 ) provide a good starting point for selecting specific functions. Then, we reverse engineer each function to identify the clipboard structures. The third step adds the ability to search for the structures into a memory analysis program. Finally, testing of the program against memory dumps from multiple Windows operating systems using textual data transferred to the clipboard from several programs verifies the programs functionality.
Clipboard functions
While there is a large amount of documentation (Microsoft.com; netez.com; Petzold, 1999 ) on how to use and access the Windows clipboard via application programmer interfaces (APIs), there is no documentation on the underlying structures used in user32.dll to manage the clipboard. Therefore, the reverse engineering process begins with the functions in Fig. 1 . It then analyzes the functions statically and dynamically. The analysis process creates an analysis profile in a virtual machine. Using an application (e.g., Notepad) to transfer data to the clipboard provides an environment with known data. After capturing a memory dump and transferring the dump to the host machine, the dynamic analysis begins. Observe that the transfer of the memory dump is done such that the file is not loaded into the clipboard (e.g., by moving the file within Windows Explorer). Once the dump file is on the host machine and the virtual machine halted, the dynamic analysis process places instruction breakpoints at the beginning of the Get-ClipboardData function. Although not necessary, performing dynamic analysis while having a memory dump allows the investigators to make changes to the program at the same time they are performing reverse code analysis on the clipboard functions.
GetClipboardData begins with the standard saving of registers and resetting of the stack pointer. As shown in Fig. 4 , it then makes a call to NtUserGetClipboardData to retrieve the pointer to the clipboard data. This is actually an interrupt that moves the process from user space to kernel space. NtU-serGetClipboardData is a kernel function that begins by retrieving a pointer to the Windows Station object for the d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 8 ( 2 0 1 1 ) S 1 1 8 eS 1 2 4 current thread. It then calls xxxGetClipboardData, passing along the pointer to the Windows Station and the requested clipboard format. xxxGetClipboardData then iterates through the different formats stored in the clipboard until it finds the matching one. The clipboarddata is then placed in allocated memory and returned back to GetClipboardData. If the clipboard data was already present in the process (either because it originated there or due to a previous paste operation), the symbol gphn points to the allocated memory. If not, new memory is allocated and the "pointer" returned by NtU-serGetClipboardData is converted into an actual pointer by NtUserCreateLocalMemHandle. gphn is the head of a linked list of clipboard records. There are four variables in each clipboard record ( Table 2 ). The first is a pointer to the next element in the linked list (null if it is the last element in the list). The second, at offset 0x04 (0x08 on 64bit machines) is the format of the current record. The third, at offset 0x08 (0x10 on 64-bit machines) is unknown. Finally, the fourth at offset 0x0c (0x18 on 64-bit machines) is a handle to the data. The code loops through the linked list until it finds the correct record. Once the data is ready for return to the requesting application, GetClipboardData allocates space on the heap. Finally, depending on the requested format, it loads the appropriate data into the space. For text, the handle is a unicode string. The function then sends this handle to the requesting application.
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Tools
There are two open source tools that the clipboard structure extraction can be implemented in. The first, the Volatility Framework (The Volatility Framework,), is "a completely open collection of tools, implemented in Python under the GNU General Public License for the traction of digital artifacts from volatile memory (RMA) samples." that extract forensic artifacts from memory dumps. The second, CMAT (Okolica and Peterson, 2010 ) is a C program that extracts forensic artifacts from memory dumps or from a Xen virtual machine (Dodge et al., 2010) . Depending on the specifics of the application, either tool would suffice. This study uses CMAT. In order to reach the clipboard, the process on the user side shown in Fig. 5 iterates through each process sorted by session ID (Okolica and Peterson, 2010) . For each process, CMAT first locates the loader table and then iterates through it to find user32.dll. If user32.dll is not loaded for a given process (e.g., because it has no user interface), then that process does not have access to the clipboard. Once the loader entry for user32.dll is found,the PDB file for user32.dll is downloaded from the Microsoft symbol server, assuming it is not already resident locally. Next, the offset for the gphn symbol is located in the PDB file. This offset provides a location to find gphn within the user32.dll virtual address space.
It is possible that the user closed the application after copying data to the clipboard. Recall that the clipboard bridges user space and kernel space. While each process has a local copy of the clipboard once it has accessed the clipboard functions, the kernel also has the clipboard. Therefore, until overwritten, clipboard data for a closed process is still Fig. 5 e Clipboard Extraction Process Flow (User side). d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 8 ( 2 0 1 1 ) S 1 1 8 eS 1 2 4 S121 available in the clipboard. Because there may be this data, the kernel module, win32k.sys is used to locate and retrieve the clipboard. As shown in Fig. 6 , CMAT first locates win32k.sys in PsLoadedModuleList and then uses its debug section to retrieve win32k.pdb. Using win32k.pdb, the location of gSharedInfo is found. CMAT then iterates through the table of clipboard formats pointed to by an entry in the Windows Station. Once CMAT finds the appropriate format and its associated handle, CMAT converts the handle (if it was not already) into a memory pointer to the clipboard data. Finally, CMAT retrieves the clipboard.
Datasets
Two publically available memory dumps exist for testing and validating memory analysis tools. In addition to these two publically available datasets, the testing uses additional memory dumps that include known clipboard objects. There are two reasons for this. First, none of the publically available datasets were created with clipboard data in mind. Therefore, there is no way to know if the clipboard contains any information to find. Second, none of these datasets include Windows 7 or any 64 bit operating system. For completeness, we created additional memory dumps for Windows 7, Windows Vista, and Windows XP (both 32 bit and 64 bit). Each of these dumps include clipboard data from Notepad, Microsoft Word, and Excel. For this initial investigation, the only data types implemented are ASCII and Unicode strings. Implementation of additional data types such as OLE objects, and the reverse engineering of the dynamic link libraries and drivers that implement them, is left for future work.
Results
As shown in Table 3 d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 8 ( 2 0 1 1 ) S 1 1 8 eS 1 2 4 S122 all cases, the tool recovers the text information in the clipboard. In addition to the text information, the tool identifies several other formats, including OLE private objects and idataobjects. For instance, for Microsoft Excel, the data exists in a total of eleven formats in the clipboard. Although not part of this experiment, parsing these additional formats would have allowed the extraction of additional formatting information.
Conclusions and future work
The methodology successfully retrieved the text from several different applications, which included Notepad, Microsoft Word, and Microsoft Excel. There is no reason to believe the methodology would be any less successful at retrieving clipboard text stored from any other application. In addition, the code worked unchanged for Windows XP, Vista, and 7 with only modifications for 32 and 64 bit. This suggests that the underlying clipboard structures have not changed for a long time. Unfortunately, there are many undocumented structures including dataobjects and OLE Private Objects and while the methodology worked great for text, it was unable to retrieve information from these data objects. Specifically, when the methodology was applied to copying files to the clipboard, the methodology was unable to determine the file name. Further work is required to determine the format of these structures.
Much of the work in memory forensics to date has focused on kernel structures. While these structures are a prerequisite to any further analysis, they are only a first step. Forensic analysis of user-level structures is a critical next step in memory forensics. Fig. 3 provides a process for reversing Windows drivers and dynamic link libraries to extract the structures needed for analysis of user-level data. Further work is required to develop and generalize this methodology.
